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Abstract
This paper quanti￿es the importance of non-wage job characteristics to workers by
estimating a structural on-the-job search model. The model generalizes the standard
search framework by allowing workers to search for jobs based on both wages and
job-speci￿c non-wage utility ￿ows. Within the structure of the search model, data
on accepted wages and wage changes at job transitions identify the importance of non-
wage utility through revealed preference. The parameters of the model are estimated by
simulated minimum distance using the 1997 cohort of the National Longitudinal Survey
of Youth (NLSY97). The estimates reveal that utility from non-wage job characteristics
plays an important role in determining job mobility, the value of jobs to workers, and the
gains from job search. More speci￿cally, non-wage utility accounts for approximately
one-third of the total gains from job mobility. These large non-pecuniary gains from
search are missed by search models which assume that the wage captures the entire
value of a job to a worker.
Keywords: job search, non-wage job characteristics, wage growth, revealed preference,
compensating di￿erentials
JEL codes: D1, D9, J4, J61 Introduction
Non-wage job characteristics are important determinants of job mobility and choice. Impor-
tant non-wage job characteristics include employer provided health insurance (Gruber and
Madrian, 2004), employer provided retirement bene￿ts, ￿exible hours (Altonji and Paxson,
1992), paid vacation, occupational choice (Goddeeris, 1988), risk of injury or death (Thaler
and Rosen, 1975), commuting time (White, 1988), on-site amenities, or a whole host of
other, possibly intangible or heterogeneously valued, 1 job characteristics. Despite their im-
portance, there is relatively little research that estimates search models with non-wage job
characteristics and studies their e￿ect on job choice and mobility decisions. The bulk of the
the empirical search literature assumes that the wage captures the entire value of a job and
the literature that does account for non-wage job characteristics typically focuses on a single
job characteristic. For example, Blau (1991), Bloemen (2008), Flabbi and Moro (2010) and
Głrgens (2002) estimate models with hours or hours ￿exibility, Dey and Flinn (2005, 2008)
estimate models with health insurance provision, and Sullivan (2010) estimates a model with
occupational choice. Instead of focusing on a single observable job characteristic, we estimate
a structural search model that allows workers to derive utility from their aggregate valuation
of all the non-wage characteristics of a particular job.
The goals of this paper are to estimate the total value that workers place on the non-wage
attributes of their jobs and to quantify the importance of non-wage factors in determining
individual labor market dynamics. To accomplish this goal, we estimate a search model which
augments the standard income maximizing on-the-job search framework (Burdett, 1978) by
including utility from non-wage job characteristics. In the model, employed and unemployed
workers search across jobs that o￿er di￿erent wages and levels of non-wage utility. When a
worker and ￿rm meet, the worker receives a wage o￿er and also observes a match-speci￿c
non-wage utility ￿ow which represents the net value that this particular worker places on all
the non-wage job characteristics present at the job. Search frictions are present because both
1See Bhaskar and To (1999) and Bhaskar et al. (2002).
1job o￿ers and layo￿s occur randomly, and because both wages and non-wage match values
are modeled as random draws from a distribution that is known to the worker. Following a
large fraction of the empirical search literature, we adopt a stationary, partial equilibrium
framework.2 As in the canonical on-the-job search model, wage growth occurs as workers
climb a job ladder by moving to higher wage jobs. A novel feature of the model is that it also
allows workers to bene￿t from moving to jobs that o￿er higher non-wage utility. Depending
on the importance of the non-wage side of the model, basing conclusions about the value
of job mobility solely on wages could give a misleading view of the gains to job search and
mobility. Estimating the structural model is a direct way of quantifying the importance of
the wage and non-wage channels in determining the total gains to mobility over the career.
The structural parameters are estimated by simulated minimum distance (SMD) using
the 1997 cohort of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY97). The estimates
reveal that workers place a substantial value on non-wage job characteristics, and also show
that non-wage utility ￿ows vary widely across di￿erent worker-￿rm matches. More specif-
ically, workers who are searching for a job face nearly as much dispersion in job-speci￿c
non-wage utility ￿ows as in wage o￿ers. Simulations performed using the estimated model
reveal that increases in the utility derived from non-wage job characteristics account for
nearly one-third of the total gains from job mobility. This result indicates that standard
models of on-the-job search ￿ which are based solely on wages ￿ are missing a key determi-
nant of the value of jobs, the causes of worker mobility, and the gains from job search.
Our use of the non-wage match value as an aggregate measure of the non-wage value of
a job is primarily motivated by the goal of estimating the total non-wage value of jobs to
workers. In addition, four observations about the information available in standard sources
of labor market data on the employer provided bene￿ts, tangible job characteristics, and
intangible job characteristics that di￿erentiate jobs are relevant. First, important employer
provided bene￿ts such as health insurance and retirement plans are imperfectly measured. 3
2See, for example, Flinn (2002), Jolivet et al. (2006), Bloemen (2008) and Dey and Flinn (2008).
3For example, in the 1979 and 1997 cohorts of the NLSY, information is available about whether or not
employers o￿er bene￿ts such as health insurance, but there is no information about take up of bene￿ts,
2Second, information about many tangible job characteristics, such as risk of injury or com-
muting time, is frequently unavailable. Third, measures of intangible job characteristics such
as a worker’s evaluation of his supervisor, which may be signi￿cant determinants of the value
of a job to a worker, are typically completely absent. Fourth, and perhaps most importantly,
it is likely that workers have heterogeneous preferences over the employer provided bene￿ts
and tangible and intangible job characteristics that di￿erentiate jobs. With these facts in
mind, rather than attempting to estimate the value of speci￿c job characteristics, we esti-
mate the net value of all non-wage job characteristics to a worker using the non-wage match
value.
This paper contributes to a growing literature that demonstrates the importance of ac-
counting for imperfect information, search frictions, and dynamics when estimating the value
of non-wage job characteristics. Hwang et al. (1992), Dey and Flinn (2005, 2008), and Gron-
berg and Reed (1994) all discuss the problems caused by using a static framework to analyze
non-wage job characteristics in a dynamic labor market. Most recently, Bonhomme and
Jolivet (2009) estimate the value of a number of observed job characteristics using a search
model. We take a di￿erent approach by estimating the total non-wage value of jobs using
the non-wage match value, rather than attempting to identify the value of speci￿c charac-
teristics. Becker (2010) develops a model that focuses on incorporating non-wage utility into
the equilibrium wage bargaining framework of Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) and applying
the model to unemployment insurance.
Non-wage utility ￿ows are, of course, not observed by the econometrician, so identi￿cation
is an important concern. The on-the-job search model provides a natural framework for using
data on wages, job acceptance decisions, and employment durations to infer the value that
workers place on non-wage job characteristics. Broadly speaking, the intuition behind the
identi￿cation of the model is that since a standard income maximizing search model is nested
within the utility maximizing search model, the importance of non-wage job characteristics
is identi￿ed by the extent to which an income maximizing model fails to explain the moments
dollar amount of the employer and employee contributions, or plan quality.
3used in estimation. More speci￿cally, observed patterns of job mobility and wage changes
at transitions between jobs are particularly informative about the importance of non-wage
job characteristics. To give a concrete example, a key moment matched during estimation
is the proportion of direct job-to-job transitions where workers choose to accept a decrease
in wages.4 Wage declines at job transitions occur frequently: in the NLSY97 data, reported
wages decline for more than one-third of direct transitions between jobs. Taking the structure
of the model as given, this type of transition indicates through revealed preference that a
worker is willing to accept lower wages in exchange for higher non-wage utility at a speci￿c
job.
During estimation, we are careful to account for the two alternative explanations for
observed wage decreases at direct transitions between jobs that have dominated the empirical
search literature up to this point. Ignoring either of these possible explanations during
estimation would lead to an upward bias in the estimated importance of non-wage utility.
The ￿rst explanation is that if a job ends exogenously, a worker might choose to move
directly to a lower paying job to avoid unemployment, if this option is available. 5 The second
explanation is that measurement error in wages might cause some transitions between jobs
that are actually accompanied by wage increases to be erroneously shown as wage decreases
in the data.6 Our model allows for both of these explanations, and also adds a third possible
explanation: a worker could choose to move from a high wage job to a lower wage job that
o￿ers a higher level of non-wage utility. We incorporate the ￿rst explanation into the model
by allowing existing jobs to end involuntarily (from the perspective of the worker) in the
same time period that a job o￿er is received from a new employer. The probability that
this event occurs is identi￿ed using NLSY97 data that identi￿es direct job-to-job transitions
that begin with involuntary job endings. Existing research has not used this type of data to
4Throughout the paper, direct transitions refer to transitions between jobs that occur without an inter-
vening spell of unemployment.
5For example, Jolivet et al. (2006) assume that all direct job-to-job transitions accompanied by wage
decreases are the result of simultaneous job endings and mobility to new jobs.
6Flinn (2002) adopts this approach, and Wolpin (1992) allows for both measurement error in wages and
simultaneous exogenous job endings and outside job o￿ers.
4identify involuntary direct transitions between employers.
We account for measurement error in wages by estimating a parametric model of measure-
ment error jointly along with the other parameters of the model. 7 Although at ￿rst glance
it might appear that measurement error in wages and match-speci￿c non-wage utility are
observationally equivalent, Section 4.4 of this paper demonstrates that they actually have
very di￿erent implications for the simulated moments used to estimate the model. More
speci￿cally, although measurement error and non-wage utility can both account for observed
wage decreases at job transitions, neither feature on its own is capable of simultaneously
explaining the extent of variation in wages, amount of wage growth over the career, and
frequency of wage declines at direct job transitions in the NLSY97.
The parameter estimates reveal that the variation in non-wage utility ￿ows across worker-
￿rm matches is nearly as large as the variation in the wage o￿er distribution. This implies
that there are substantial gains to workers from job search based on non-wage factors. Al-
though the parameter estimates provide direct evidence on the importance of the non-wage
side of the model, perhaps a more informative way of examining the implications of the util-
ity maximizing search model is to study simulated data generated by the estimated model.
In these data, wages explain only 68 percent of the total variation in the one-period utility
￿ows that workers receive from employment, which leaves match speci￿c non-wage utility to
account for the remainder. On average, measuring the value of a job using only the wage
substantially understates the true value of a job to a worker. More speci￿cally, in 88 percent
of all jobs in the simulated data, workers place a positive net value on the non-wage charac-
teristics of their job. The fact that workers receive negative non-wage utility ￿ows in only 12
percent of accepted job o￿ers shows that although utility maximizing workers in the model
are perfectly willing to accept higher wages in exchange for undesirable job characteristics,
the search model reveals a strong tendency for workers to sort into jobs with non-wage job
characteristics that they are willing to pay for. The positive average non-wage value of jobs
7We ￿nd that measurement error accounts for 12.7 percent of the variation in wage o￿ers, which is
reassuringly within the range reported by Bound et al. (2001).
5is generated by two features of the search environment. First, the reservation utility strategy
followed by unemployed agents implies that the accepted job o￿ers observed in the simulated
data are truncated from below. Second, on-the-job search implies that workers climb both
wage and non-wage utility ladders as they move between employers.
The search model with non-wage job characteristics has important implications for the
study of compensating di￿erentials, a topic of considerable interest to economists. Existing
papers such as Hwang et al. (1992) and Gronberg and Reed (1994) make the point that
in general, estimates of compensating di￿erentials will be biased unless search frictions are
taken into account. Our primary contribution to this line of research is to use the estimated
structural search model to obtain a direct estimate of the magnitude of the bias caused by
estimating compensating di￿erentials using a static framework. Standard hedonic regression
approaches to valuing non-wage job characteristics implicitly assume that workers are free to
select an optimal job from a perfectly known labor market hedonic wage curve. In contrast,
the simulated data from our model contain a sample of wages and non-wage utility received
by workers who must search for jobs in a dynamic labor market. When we estimate a
standard hedonic regression using these data, the estimated marginal willingness to pay for
non-wage job characteristics is biased downward by approximately 50 percent from the true
value used to generate the data.
This application of the model o￿ers an explanation for the fact that empirical support for
the theory compensating di￿erentials is relatively weak, despite a vast literature on estimat-
ing these di￿erentials. The intuition behind the downward bias in estimated compensating
di￿erentials is that in a search model, the only information provided by accepted pairs of
wages and non-wage utility is that they exceed a reservation utility threshold. In this setting,
they do not directly reveal the marginal willingness to pay for non-wage job characteristics
as they would in a static, frictionless, perfect information world where workers maximize
utility subject to a given labor market hedonic wage locus.
In the following section, we develop a partial equilibrium model of on-the-job search with
non-wage utility. In Section 3, we discuss the data set used to estimate our model and in
6Section 4 we discuss our econometric methodology and some important identi￿cation issues.
Section 5 presents our parameter estimates and discusses the e￿ect of non-wage utility on
labor market outcomes. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Search Model with Utility from Non-Wage Job
Characteristics
This section presents the search model used to estimate the importance of non-wage utility.
The model is set in discrete time. Agents maximize the discounted sum of expected utility
over an in￿nite time horizon in a stationary environment. In each time period, individuals
occupy one of two states: employment or unemployment. 8 Agents randomly receive job
o￿ers while unemployed and employed, and the employed face a constant risk of exogenous
job loss.9 When a job ends exogenously, there is no chance of recall. For ease of exposition,
this section describes the decision problem facing a single agent. However, we allow for
person-speci￿c unobserved heterogeneity when estimating the model (Section 4).
2.1 Preferences and Job O￿ers
The utility received by an employed agent is determined by the log-wage, w, and the match-
speci￿c non-wage utility ￿ow, . The one-period utility from employment is
U(w;) = w + ; (1)
where both w and  are speci￿c to a particular match between a worker and employer, and
are constant for the duration of the match. A job o￿er consists of a random draw of (w;)
from the distribution F(w;), which is a primitive of the model.
The structure of the search and matching process in the model labor market is as fol-
8Following the majority of the search literature, the model does not distinguish between unemployment
and non-participation in the labor market.
9The terms exogenous job endings and layo￿ are used interchangeably in the remainder of the paper.
7lows. When a worker and ￿rm randomly meet, the worker receives a job o￿er. At the same
time, the worker observes the complete bundle of non-wage job characteristics present at
the ￿rm. These characteristics include employer provided bene￿ts (health insurance), tan-
gible job characteristics (risk of injury, commuting time), and intangible job characteristics
(friendliness of co-workers). Based on his preferences, which may be heterogeneous across
agents, the worker determines the net value of the non-wage job characteristics present at
this ￿rm (). The worker then decides whether or not to accept the job o￿er. Once a job
o￿er is accepted, the wage and non-wage component of the o￿er remain constant for the
duration of the employment spell.10 Since our primary goal is to estimate the total impor-
tance of non-wage job characteristics to workers, which is captured by , we do not attempt
to determine how much of the variation in non-wage utility is due to ￿rm level variation in
non-wage job characteristics versus preference heterogeneity. 11
2.2 Unemployed Search
Unemployed agents search for jobs, which arrive randomly with probability u. Since w
and  are additively separable in the utility function, it is convenient to de￿ne the agent’s
decision problem in terms of total utility, w + , where U(w;)  U and U is distributed as
H(U). The discounted expected value of lifetime utility for an unemployed agent is
V
u = b + [uE maxfV
u;V
e(U
0)g + (1   u)V
u]; (2)
where b is the one-period utility ￿ow from unemployment, which re￿ects the value of unem-
ployment bene￿ts and leisure, and  is the discount factor. The term V e(U0) represents the
expected discounted value of lifetime utility for an agent employed in a job with utility level
10Section 3 explains that the assumption of constant wages within jobs is consistent with the NLSY97
data used to estimate the model.
11We leave decomposing the sources of variation in match-speci￿c non-wage utility as an interesting,
although di￿cult extension for future research. Empirical work along these lines would require detailed data
on the complete set of non-wage job characteristics valued by workers along with su￿ciently high mobility
rates between jobs with di￿erent characteristics to identify preference heterogeneity. In addition, data on
the ￿rm side of the market, ideally matched worker-￿rm data, would be useful to control for unobserved,
￿rm-speci￿c variation in working conditions and job amenities.
8U0.
The optimal search strategy for an unemployed agent is a reservation utility strategy,
which is analogous to the reservation wage strategy found in income maximizing search
models. The rule is to accept any job o￿er which o￿ers a one-period utility ￿ow greater
than the reservation level, U, and reject all other o￿ers. Appendix A presents the formal
derivation of U.
2.3 On-the-job Search
In each time period, with probability e an employed agent receives a job o￿er from an
outside ￿rm. The worker may accept the job o￿er, or reject it and continue working for his
current employer. Job matches end with exogenous probability l. When a job ends for this
reason, the worker is forced to become unemployed. With probability le, a worker’s current
job exogenously ends and he receives a job o￿er from a new employer in the same time
period. When this happens, the worker can accept the new o￿er, or become unemployed.
Finally, with probability (1   e   l   le) the job does not end exogenously and no new
o￿ers are received, so the worker is forced to remain in his current job.
The discounted expected value of lifetime utility for a worker who is currently employed
in a job with utility level U is
V








0)g + (1   e   l   le)V
e(U)]: (3)
The ￿rst bracketed term in equation (3), eE maxfV e(U);V e(U0)g; represents the expected
value of the best option available in the next time period for an employed individual who
receives a job o￿er from a new employer. 12 The second bracketed term, lV u, corresponds to
12The value function re￿ects the fact that in this model it is never optimal for a worker to quit a job and
enter unemployment.
9the case where a job exogenously ends and the worker is forced to enter unemployment. The
third bracketed term, le maxfV u;V e(U0)g, represents the case where the worker is laid-o￿
but also receives a job o￿er from a new employer. The ￿nal bracketed term represents the
case where the worker is neither laid-o￿ nor receives an outside job o￿er.
In this stationary search environment, optimal decisions for employed agents are based
on comparisons of one-period utility ￿ows. When an employed agent receives an o￿er from
an outside ￿rm but does not experience an exogenous job ending, a simple reservation utility
strategy is optimal. Since V e(U) is increasing in U, the rule is to accept the o￿er if it o￿ers
greater utility than the current job (U0 > U), and reject the o￿er otherwise (U0  U). If a
worker’s job exogenously ends and he receives a new job o￿er at the same time, which occurs
with probability le, the situation is identical to the one faced by an unemployed agent who
receives a new job o￿er. As a result, he will choose to accept or reject the o￿er based on the
unemployed reservation utility level U.
In the remainder of the paper, we will refer to direct job-to-job transitions that occur as
the result of a simultaneous layo￿ and job o￿er as ￿involuntary￿ transitions between employ-
ers. This terminology re￿ects the fact that although a direct job-to-job transition occurs,
the worker’s previous job ended involuntarily (exogenously). For agents in the model, vol-
untary and involuntary transitions are fundamentally di￿erent types of job mobility. When
a voluntary job-to-job transition occurs, utility increases ( U0 > U). In contrast, when an
involuntary transition occurs, the new job o￿er is preferable to unemployment ( U0 > U),
but it may o￿er lower utility than the previous job which exogenously ended (U 0 < U).
3 Data
For several reasons, we use the 1997 rather than the venerable 1979 cohort of the NLSY
to estimate our model. To begin with, the NLSY97 is more representative of current labor
market conditions. Since we are only interested in young, inexperienced workers, the NLSY97
now has a long enough time series for our purposes. In addition, the NLSY97 design team
10incorporated lessons from the NLSY79 and has a more consistent methodology (Pergamit
et al., 2001).
The NLSY97 is a nationally representative sample of 8,984 individuals who were between
the ages of 12 and 16 on December 31, 1996. Interviews have been conducted annually since
1997, and we use data from interviews up to the 2006 interview to estimate the model. One
component of our estimation strategy is to select as uniform a population as is possible. Thus
we focus on young, unmarried, low-skilled men who are at the beginning of their careers.
The information from the annual interviews is used to construct a weekly employment record
for each respondent.
Since the maximum age that an individual could reach during the sample period is only 26
years, our results should be viewed as applying to young workers who tend to be quite mobile
during this early phase of their career. Whether the results generalize to older workers, or
di￿erent cohorts of workers, is an open question. The NLSY97 collects extensive information
about labor market behavior and educational experiences which provide the information
needed to study the transition from schooling to employment, early career mobility between
employers, and the associated dynamics of wages. The model is estimated using a sample of
men from the NLSY97. Women are excluded for the usual reason of avoiding the di￿culties
associated with modeling female labor force participation. Men who are ever married during
the sample period are also excluded to avoid issues relating to household search. Since we are
interested in low-skilled workers, the sample excludes individuals who attend college at any
point during the sample period. Men enter the estimation sample when they stop attending
high school. As is standard in the empirical search literature, individuals who ever serve in
the military or are self employed are excluded from the sample.
The NLSY97 provides a weekly employment record for each respondent which is ag-
gregated into a monthly13 labor force history for the purposes of estimation. First, each
individual is classi￿ed as unemployed or employed full time for each month depending on
whether more weeks were spent employed or unemployed during the month. 14 Next, em-
13For tie-breaking purposes, we use a 5-week month.
14Non-participation and unemployment are considered to be the same state for the purposes of aggregating
11ployed individuals are assigned a monthly employer based on the employer that the worker
spent the most weeks working for during the month. The monthly wage is the one asso-
ciated with the monthly employer. The monthly employment record contains a complete
record of employment durations, direct transitions between employers that occur without an
intervening spell of unemployment, transitions into unemployment, and the growth in wages
resulting from mobility between employers.
Since the importance of non-wage job characteristics is identi￿ed in part by job-to-job
transitions, we are careful to di￿erentiate between those that are voluntary and those that
are not. To identify involuntary job-to-job transitions we use the stated reason that a worker
left their job. We consider ￿layo￿s,￿ ￿plant closings,￿ ￿end of a temporary or seasonal job,￿
￿discharged or ￿red￿ or ￿program ended￿ to be involuntary. While these data may be some-
what noisy, we are reassured by the summary statistics which show that direct transitions
we classify as strictly involuntary are more likely to result in a wage decline (Table 1). In
addition, on average, workers who make involuntary transitions between employers experi-
ence nearly a 2 percent decline in wages. In contrast, wages increase on average by 8 percent
at all transitions between employers.
The ￿nal issue worthy of discussion regarding the data is the treatment of within-job
variation in wages. In the NLSY97, when a job persists across survey interviews, which
occur approximately one year apart, a new measurement of the wage is taken. If a job does
not last across interview years, only the initial measurement of the wage is available. In
principle, it would be possible to allow for within-job variation in wages using these data.
However, as discussed by Flinn (2002), jobs with observed wage changes are not a random
sample from the population, so there are di￿cult selection issues which must be confronted
when estimating an on-the-job wage process using these data. Even more importantly for
our purposes, since the NLSY97 is still a relatively short panel, the majority of jobs do
not persist across survey years. For these jobs, it is impossible to observe on-the-job wage
growth. More speci￿cally, we only observe a single wage for 72 percent of all jobs in our
the data. Full time employment is considered to be jobs that involve at least twenty hours of work per week.
12Table 1: Descriptive Statistics: NLSY97 Data
Job Number within Cycle
Job 1 Job 2 Job 3
Mean log-wage 1.979 2.038 2.061
Std. dev. of log-wage 0.425 0.458 0.457
Mean employment spell duration 8.939 9.271 9.738
Number of observations 2614 940 382
Type of Employer Switch
All Involuntary
Pr(wage decrease) at job-to-job move 0.364 0.460
Mean w at job-to-job switch 0.081  0:017
Mean w at job-to-job switch jw > 0 0.359 0.322
Mean w at job-to-job switch jw < 0  0:327  0:345
All Jobs
Mean unemployment spell duration 5.908
Mean number of cycles per person 2.878
Std. dev. of number of cycles per person 1.793
Mean work experience 40.01
Fraction of job-to-job transitions that are involuntary 0.151
Number of people 980
Mean number of months per person 54.153
data. In addition, we are unable to reject the null hypothesis that wages are constant within
job spells in our estimation sample. Given these features of the data, there is little hope
of precisely estimating an on-the-job wage growth process. As a result, we restrict wages
to be constant within job spells for the purposes of estimation. When multiple wages are
reported for a particular job, we use the ￿rst reported wage as the wage for the entire job
spell. Moreover, for our application, with our focus on young, unskilled workers during a
highly mobile stage of their career, constant wages within jobs does not seem unrealistic.
3.1 Descriptive Statistics
This section highlights the key characteristics of the data used to estimate the importance
of non-wage job characteristics in determining employment outcomes. It is convenient to
describe the labor market histories in the data and the data generated by the search model
in terms of employment cycles, as in Wolpin (1992). An employment cycle begins with
13unemployment and includes all of the following employment spells that occur without an
intervening unemployment spell. When an individual enters unemployment, a new cycle
begins. In the remainder of the paper, whenever a job is referred to by number, it represents
the position of the job within an employment cycle.
Table 1 shows the means and standard deviations of key variables from the sample of
the NLSY97 used in this analysis. There are 980 individuals in the data who remain in
the sample for an average of 54.2 months, and these people experience an average of 2.88
employment cycles. The top section of the table shows that as individuals move between em-
ployers within an employment cycle, the average wage and employment duration increase. 15
The middle section of the table shows that although mean wages increase as individuals
move directly between jobs, conditional on switching employers without an intervening un-
employment spell there is a 36 percent chance that an individual reports a lower wage at
his new job.16 For individuals who report that the direct transition between employers was
involuntary, the mean wage change is negative and the probability of a wage decrease rises
to 46 percent. Measurement error in wages certainly accounts for some fraction of the ob-
served wage decreases at voluntary transitions between employers. However, the prevalence
of these wage decreases and the increased probability of observing a wage decline at an
involuntary transition both suggest a role for non-wage job characteristics in determining
mobility between jobs.
4 Estimation
The parameters of the model are estimated by simulated minimum distance (SMD). This
section begins by specifying the distributional assumptions about the job o￿er distribution,
measurement error in wages, and unobserved heterogeneity needed to estimate the model.
15Statistics are not reported for more than three jobs within a cycle because only a very small number of
people have four or more consecutive jobs without entering unemployment.
16This number is consistent with existing estimates of the fraction of direct employer-to-employer transi-
tions that involve a wage decrease. Bowlus and Neumann (2006) report that 40 percent of direct transitions
involve a wage decrease in the NLSY79.
14Then it explains how the simulated data is generated, describes the estimation algorithm,
and discusses identi￿cation.
4.1 Distributional Assumptions
The Wage O￿er Distribution
Estimating the model requires specifying the distribution F(w;), which is a primitive of the





(w)  N(w;w) (5)
	()  N(0;): (6)
Relaxing the assumption that o￿ers of w and  are independent would require empirically
determining whether workers tend to receive high non-wage utility, which is unobserved by
the econometrician, from jobs that o￿er high wages. Arguments can be made for either pos-
itive (health insurance) or negative (risk of injury or death) correlation between w and . In
the absence of compelling information, we assume zero correlation. Section 5.3 demonstrates
that our key empirical results are robust to the independence assumption by adopting the
alternative assumption that (w;) are distributed bivariate normal, and re-estimating the
model for two di￿erent values of the correlation parameter. As a practical matter, we do not
believe that there are any moments from the NLSY97 which would identify this correlation.
It is also worth noting that although o￿ers of (w;) are independent, the predicted values of
(w;) that are accepted by workers will still be correlated because of optimal search behavior
(Section 5.4).
17We do not attempt to endogenize the job o￿er distribution because our primary goal in this paper is
to quantify the relative importance of non-wage utility for workers, taking the o￿er distribution as given.
Developing a tractable partial equilibrium model allows us to focus directly on this issue, as in much of the
existing literature that uses search models to quantify the monetary gains to search and mobility (Jolivet
et al., 2006; Flinn, 2002; Sullivan, 2010).
15Measurement Error in Wages
A large literature surveyed by Bound et al. (2001) ￿nds that wages in typical sources of
microeconomic data are measured with error. We account for measurement error by assuming
that the relationship between the log-wage observed in the data and the true log-wage is
wo = w + ", where wo is the observed log-wage, w is the true log-wage, and "  N(0;")
represents measurement error in wages that is independent of the true wage. 18 The parameter
" is estimated jointly along with the other parameters in the model. Section 4.4 discusses
how the extent of measurement error in wages is separately identi￿ed from the importance
of non-wage utility. The addition of measurement error in wages to the model does not
change the optimization problem faced by agents because optimal decisions are based on
true wages, not observed wages. However, measurement error impacts the simulated data
used to estimate the model.
Accounting for Unobserved Heterogeneity
The search model presented in Section 2 assumes that all individuals are ex ante identical
at the start of their careers, which implies that all di￿erences in wages and employment
outcomes are driven by randomness in the labor market. Although the sample of workers
from the NLSY97 used in estimation consists of a fairly homogeneous group in terms of
observable characteristics, it is possible that there are permanent di￿erences between workers
that are unobserved to the econometrician. In general, ignoring unobserved heterogeneity
during estimation will lead to biased parameter estimates if unobserved heterogeneity is
actually present.
In this application, the speci￿c concern is that ignoring unobserved di￿erences between
workers could lead to an overstatement of the importance of non-wage utility. For example,
suppose that a worker remains in a job with a wage in the bottom 5 percent of the wage
distribution over the entire sample period. If workers are assumed to be homogeneous, then
18Accounting for measurement error in this way is standard in the search literature. See, for example,
Stern (1989), Wolpin (1992), and Eckstein et al. (2009).
16the model will tend to explain the long duration of this low wage job as a situation where
the worker has a large draw of , so he is willing to remain in the low wage job because it
provides a high level of utility. However, if there is heterogeneity across workers in ability,
low ability workers could choose to remain in jobs that o￿er low wages relative to the overall
wage distribution because these jobs are actually high paying relative to their personal (low
ability) wage distribution.
We account for person-speci￿c unobserved heterogeneity in ability by allowing the mean
of the wage o￿er distribution (w) to vary across workers. Heterogeneity in preferences for
leisure is captured by allowing the reservation utility level ( U) to vary across workers. In
addition, we allow the job o￿er arrival rates while unemployed ( u) and employed (e),
the layo￿ probability (l), and the simultaneous layo￿-o￿er probability ( le) to vary across
workers to allow for the possibility that workers face di￿erent amounts of randomness in job
o￿er arrivals and exogenous job endings. 19 Following Keane and Wolpin (1997), and a large
subsequent literature, we assume that the joint distribution of unobserved heterogeneity
is a mixture of discrete types. Assume that there are J types of people in the economy,
and let j represent the proportion of type j in the population. The parameters of the
distribution of unobserved heterogeneity, fw(j);U(j);e(j);l(j);le(j);u(j);jgJ
j=1, are
estimated jointly along with the other parameters of the model.
4.2 Data Simulation
As discussed in Section 2, the optimal decision rules for the dynamic optimization problem
can be described using simple static comparisons of one-period utility ￿ows. It is straightfor-
ward to simulate data from the model using these optimal decision rules without numerically
solving for the value functions that characterize the optimization problem.
The ￿rst step when simulating the model is to randomly assign each individual in the
data to one of the J discrete types that make up the population distribution of unobserved
19Eckstein et al. (2009) also take the approach of allowing for heterogeneity in o￿er arrival and layo￿
probabilities.
17heterogeneity. Next, a simulated career is formed for each individual in the NLSY97 estima-
tion sample by randomly generating job o￿ers and exogenous job endings, and then assigning
simulated choices for each time period based on the reservation value decision rules. The
number of time periods that each simulated person appears in the simulated data is censored
to match the corresponding person in the NLSY97 data. Measurement error is added to the
simulated accepted wage data based on the assumed measurement error process.
4.3 Simulated Minimum Distance Estimation
Simulated minimum distance estimation ￿nds the vector of structural parameters that mini-
mizes the weighted di￿erence between vectors of statistics estimated using two di￿erent data
sets: the NLSY97 data, and simulated data from the model. We use the terminology sim-
ulated minimum distance to make it clear that during estimation we match moments from
the data (as in the simulated method of moments) and the parameters of an auxiliary model
(as in indirect inference).20 In this application, the auxiliary parameters are the parameters
of a reduced form wage regression. In the remainder of the paper, for brevity of notation we
refer to all of the statistics from the data that are matched during estimation as moments.
Let  = fw;;";w(j);U(j);e(j);l(j);le(j);u(j);jgJ
j=1 represent the parameter
vector that must be estimated. 21 The search model is used to simulate S arti￿cial datasets,
where each simulated dataset contains a randomly generated employment history for each
individual in the sample. The simulated and actual data are each summarized by K mo-
ments. The SMD estimate of the structural parameters minimizes the di￿erence between
the simulated and sample moments. Let mk represent the kth moment in the data, and
let mS
k() represent the kth simulated moment, where the superscript S denotes averaging
across the S arti￿cial datasets. The vector of di￿erences between the simulated and actual
20See Stern (1997) for a survey of simulation based estimation, and Smith (1993) for the development of
indirect inference. Recent examples of papers that use this approach to estimating search models include
Eckstein et al. (2009) and Yamaguchi (2010).
21The parameter vector that is estimated does not include the discount factor ( ), or the one period
utility ￿ow from unemployment (b). However, by choosing a value for the discount factor, and ￿xing the
other parameter values at the SMD estimates, we can use the structure of the model to compute b using
equation (10).
18moments is g()0 = [m1   mS
1();:::;mK   mS
K()]; and the simulated minimum distance
estimate of  minimizes the following objective function,
() = g()
0Wg(); (7)
where W is a weighting matrix. We use a diagonal weighting matrix during estimation,
where each diagonal element is the inverse of the variance of the corresponding moment. We
estimate W using a nonparametric bootstrap with 300,000 replications. Bootstrapping the
matrix W is convenient because it is not necessary to update the weighting matrix during
estimation. Parameter estimates are obtained by minimizing the objective function shown
in equation (7) using simulated annealing. 22 Simulated moments are averaged over S = 25
simulated datasets. The standard errors are computed using a nonparametric bootstrap
using 900 draws from the NLSY97 data.
4.4 Choice of Moments and Identi￿cation
This section discusses the moments targeted during estimation and provides an informal
discussion of how they identify the parameters of the structural model. Table 2 lists the 44
moments from the NLSY97 that are used to estimate the model. Most of the parameters,
with the exception of those governing the importance of non-wage utility, are identi￿ed as
they would be in a standard on-the-job search model by moments that summarize wages,
employment and unemployment durations, and transition rates. For example, the moments
shown in Panel 1 of Table 2 describe the ￿rst three employment spells within employment
cycles using the mean and standard deviation of accepted wages, and the mean employment
spell duration. The wage moments provide information about the parameters of the wage
o￿er distribution. Recall that employers within a cycle represent a sequence of direct transi-
tions between employers that occur without an intervening spell of unemployment, so mean
22See Go￿e et al. (1994) for a discussion of the simulated annealing algorithm and FORTRAN source code
to implement the algorithm. The primary advantage of this algorithm is that it is a global search algorithm
that can escape local optima.
19wages conditional on employer number also provide information about wage growth from job
search. Also, the increase in the average employment duration as workers move between jobs
re￿ects improvements in job match values from on-the-job search. The moments shown in
Panel 2 of Table 2 provide additional information about unemployment spell durations, job
durations, and transition probabilities which help to identify the job o￿er and layo￿ rates.
Table 2: Moments of the NLSY97 Data and Simulated Data
Moment NLSY97 Data Simulated
Cycle Moments (Panel 1)
Mean log-wage (employer 1) 1.9791 1.9871
Std. dev. of log-wage (employer 1) 0.4249 0.3968
Mean job duration (employer 1) 8.9392 9.1354
Mean log-wage (employer 2) 2.0377 2.0537
Std. dev. of log-wage (employer 2) 0.4582 0.4151
Mean job duration (employer 2) 9.2713 10.0262
Mean log-wage (employer 3) 2.0608 1.9988
Std. dev. of log-wage (employer 3) 0.4572 0.4686
Mean job duration (employer 3) 9.7382 9.2036
Transition and Duration Moments (Panel 2)
Mean unemployment spell duration 5.9087 5.7809
Std. dev(unemp. duration) 7.7319 7.5213
Pr(transition from employment to unemployment) 0.0364 0.0383
Pr(job-to-job transition) 0.0364 0.0383
Pr(unemp. duration = 1) 0.2375 0.3196
Pr(unemp. duration = 2) 0.1697 0.1150
Pr(unemp. duration = 3) 0.1092 0.0928
Pr(emp. duration = 1) 0.1423 0.1488
Pr(emp. duration = 2) 0.1412 0.1296
Pr(emp. duration = 3) 0.1209 0.1037
Mean number of ￿rms per cycle 1.6983 1.7777
Std. dev. of number of ￿rms per cycle 1.1513 1.0586
Mean number of ￿rms over career 4.3755 4.2010
Continued on next page
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Moment NLSY97 Data Simulated
Job-to-job Transition Moments (Panel 3)
Mean w at job-to-job switch 0.0812 0.1097
Mean w at job-to-job switch jw > 0 0.3592 0.3841
Mean w at job-to-job switch jw < 0  0:3273  0:3099
Pr(wage decrease at job-to-job transition) 0.3640 0.3871
Pr(wage decrease at involuntary job-to-job transition) 0.4601 0.4979
Mean w at involuntary job-to-job switch  0:0168  0:0289
Mean w at involuntary job-to-job switch jw > 0 0.3224 0.3341
Mean w at involuntary job-to-job switch jw < 0  0:3454  0:3649
Fraction of job-to-job transitions that are involuntary 0.1505 0.1592





Within-person cov(wages) 0.0448 0.0510
Cov(1st wage, 1st unemp. duration)  0:1439  0:1582
Cov(1st unemp. duration, 1st emp. duration)  1:4050  1:6091
Within-person cov(mean(w),mean(% months unemp.))  0:0332  0:0346
Cov(wage,transition into unemp.)  0:0560  0:0589
Other Moments (Panel 6)
Across-person std. dev(w) 0.3131 0.3191
Across-person std. dev(unemp. duration) 5.9004 4.2334
Across-person std. dev. of number of ￿rms 2.9437 3.0766
Across-person mean % months unemp. 0.2745 0.2953
Across-person std. dev(% months unemp.) 0.2587 0.2446
Notes: Simulated data is generated using the estimated model.
An important distinction between this paper and the existing literature is that we allow
for three possible explanations for observed wage declines at direct job-to-job transitions. The
possible explanations are measurement error in wages, involuntary job endings that occur at
the same time as outside job o￿ers, and non-wage utility. To the best of our knowledge, this is
the ￿rst paper to build a model that incorporates all of these explanations, and estimates the
model to quantify the importance of each. 23 The most straightforward of these three possible
23Flinn (2002) allows for measurement error in wages, Wolpin (1992) allows for both measurement error
in wages and simultaneous exogenous job endings and outside job o￿ers, and Bonhomme and Jolivet (2009)
allow for simultaneous job endings and job o￿ers in a search model where speci￿c non-wage job characteristics
enter the utility function.
21explanations from the perspective of identi￿cation is involuntary job endings that occur at
the same time as outside job o￿ers. The probability that this event occurs is represented in
the model by the parameter le. As discussed in Section 3, we use data from the NLSY97 on
the reason that jobs end to distinguish between voluntary and involuntary direct transitions
between employers. If an individual reports that a job ends involuntarily, and he moves to
a new job without experiencing an intervening spell of unemployment, then a simultaneous
exogenous job ending and accepted outside o￿er has occurred. It follows that the fraction of
direct job-to-job transitions in the data that are involuntary (Panel 3 of Table 2) identi￿es
le.
To see the importance of accounting for involuntary transitions between employers during
estimation, note that within the structure of the model, a voluntary transition to a lower
wage job can only be explained by measurement error or non-wage utility. In contrast, if a
job exogenously ends and a new o￿er is received, a worker could move to a job that o￿ers
lower utility than his previous job because it is preferable to unemployment. More concretely,
suppose that a job paying wage w exogenously ends, and the worker simultaneously receives
a new outside job o￿er (w0;0); where w0 < w. The worker will accept a wage decrease equal
to (w0 w) instead of becoming unemployed if U(w0;0) > U: If the presence of involuntary
transitions in the data was ignored during estimation, it would force the model to account
for all negative wage changes at job transitions in the data with either measurement error
in wages or non-wage utility.
Taking the identi￿cation of le as given, it remains to discuss identi￿cation of the im-
portance of measurement error in wages, true variation in wage o￿ers, and non-wage utility.
At ￿rst glance, it might appear di￿cult to distinguish the e￿ects of non-wage utility from
measurement error without relying on validation data to identify misreported wages. How-
ever, the parameters that determine measurement error in wages ( "), true variation in wage
o￿ers (w), and variation in non-wage utility () actually have very di￿erent implications
for the moments used during estimation.
22To understand how " and  are separately identi￿ed it is useful to begin with the
standard income maximizing on-the-job search model which assumes that  = 0. In such a
model, job acceptance is governed by a reservation wage w, as opposed to the reservation
utility level (U) in our utility maximizing search model. In the standard model, unem-
ployment durations and observed accepted wages identify w;w;u; and w. Given w and
w, job-to-job transitions identify e, and transitions from employment to unemployment
identify l. Since job mobility choices are based only on wages, voluntary moves to lower
wage jobs must be attributed to measurement error in wages, so this feature of the data
identi￿es ". In order to match the frequency of wage declines at job transitions shown in
Panel 3 of Table 2, " must be relatively large. However, as " increases, w must decrease,
or else the model will generate too much variation in observed wages relative to the data
(Panel 1 of Table 2). In other words, when the amount of measurement error in the model is
high, the amount of true variation in wage o￿ers must be low in order to match the observed
variation in wages in the NLSY97. This property of the model is demonstrated in columns
1 and 2 of Table 3, which show the parameter estimates for a restricted version of the model
which assumes that  = 0 along with the estimates for the unrestricted model. Finally, it
is important to note that as w decreases, the model generates lower wage gains from job
search. This happens because as w decreases, there is a lower chance that an employed
worker will receive a higher outside wage o￿er.
Next, consider estimating a model with non-wage utility ( > 0). Using only the job
transition moments shown in Panel 3 of Table 2, it is impossible to separately identify "
and , because a voluntary job-to-job move to a lower observed wage could be due to either
mis-measurement of the wage or unobserved non-wage utility. The key to identifying the full
model with non-wage utility is that during estimation, we simultaneously match moments
that capture three features of the data. First, the amount of variation in wages (Panel 1 of
Table 2). Second, the frequency and magnitude of wage declines at job transitions (Panel
3 of Table 2). Third, the amount of wage growth as re￿ected in the mean wages from
the ￿rst, second and third jobs within job cycles (Panel 1 of Table 2), and the coe￿cients
23from a reduced form regression of wages on work experience (Panel 4 of Table 2). For the
reasons discussed in the previous paragraph, the model without non-wage utility is unable
to simultaneously match these three features of the data. However, the full model is able
to match these moments. This is the case because in the model with non-wage utility, as
the parameter  increases from zero, the amount of measurement error needed to explain
the frequency of wage declines at voluntary job transitions falls. As a result, w can be
relatively large without causing the model to over predict the amount of wage dispersion
in the data. As w increases, the model is able to match the amount of wage growth, the
extent of variation in wages, and the frequency of wage declines at job transitions found in
the NLSY97 data.
The ￿nal two groups of moments shown in Panels 5 and 6 of Table 2 identify the im-
portance of person-speci￿c heterogeneity in the model, which is captured by the parameters
fw(j);U(j); e(j);l(j);le(j);u(j);jgJ
j=1. For example, the within-person covariance in
wages identi￿es the person-speci￿c component of wages, just as it would in a simpler panel
data model of wages. When there is no heterogeneity in w, the model generates a within-
person covariance of zero between wages on employers that are separated by unemployment
spells. Similarly, the covariances between wages and unemployment durations, and unem-
ployment durations and employment durations provide information about the covariances
between the various person-speci￿c heterogeneity terms. Finally, the across-person standard
deviations of wages and unemployment durations (Panel 6) provide additional information
about the importance of person-speci￿c unobserved heterogeneity relative to the importance
of true randomness in determining wages and unemployment durations.
5 Empirical Results
This section discusses the estimated structural model. It begins with a discussion of the
estimated parameters and their impact on labor market outcomes. Next, we discuss the
ability of the estimated model to ￿t the data. Finally, we check the robustness of our
24estimates by re-estimating the model using alternative assumptions regarding the correlation
between log-wage o￿ers and non-wage utility.
5.1 Parameter Estimates
This section presents the estimation results based on the theoretical model discussed in Sec-
tion 2 and the econometric methodology described in Section 4. The estimated parameters
for two speci￿cations of the model are given in Table 3. In both speci￿cations, we allow
for unobserved worker heterogeneity. The ￿rst and preferred speci￿cation (1) allows for
utility from non-wage job characteristics. In the second speci￿cation (2), workers are wage
maximizers so that non-wage job characteristics are unimportant to workers’ job choice and
mobility decisions. There are two key results that are worth highlighting.
Table 3: Parameter Estimates
Speci￿cations
Parameter Notation (1) (2)
Stand. dev. of wage o￿er w 0.3176 0.2671
(0.0039) (0.0026)
Stand. dev. of non-wage match  0.2657 0.0000
(0.0063) (￿)
Stand. dev. of measurement error " 0.1777 0.2439
(0.0243) (0.0167)
Type 1
Mean wage o￿er (1) 1.0619 1.3169
(0.0521) (0.0476)
Reservation utility U(1) 1.0892 0.3893
(0.0820) (1.5078)
Pr(o￿er while unemployed) u(1) 0.0753 0.0441
(0.0484) (0.0063)
Pr(layo￿) l(1) 0.0159 0.1240
(0.0118) (0.0191)
Pr(o￿er while employed) e(1) 0.9060 0.0016
(0.0354) (0.0070)
Pr(o￿er and layo￿) le(1) 0.0780 0.2615
(0.0321) (0.0464)
Type 2
Mean wage o￿er (2) 1.7105 1.7015
(0.0069) (0.0041)
Continued on next page
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Speci￿cations
Parameter Notation (1) (2)
Reservation utility U(2) 2.0995 1.9385
(0.0067) (0.0034)
Pr(o￿er while unemployed) u(2) 0.9887 0.9196
(0.0462) (0.0383)
Pr(layo￿) l(2) 0.0001 0.0518
(0.0026) (0.0092)
Pr(o￿er while employed) e(2) 0.4972 0.5157
(0.0224) (0.0124)
Pr(o￿er and layo￿) le(2) 0.1056 0.0643
(0.0054) (0.0045)
Type 3
Mean wage o￿er (3) 2.1752 2.1544
(0.0369) (0.0335)
Reservation utility U(3) 0.9074 1.4305
(1.4014) (1.6555)
Pr(o￿er while unemployed) u(3) 0.0712 0.0767
(0.0896) (0.0425)
Pr(layo￿) l(3) 0.0011 0.0038
(0.0012) (0.0018)
Pr(o￿er while employed) e(3) 0.0472 0.0501
(0.0081) (0.0093)
Pr(o￿er and layo￿) le(3) 0.0005 0.0016
(0.0009) (0.0019)
Type Probabilities
Pr(type 1) 1 0.1141 0.1010
(0.0138) (0.0072)
Pr(type 2) 2 0.5377 0.5488
(0.0252) (0.0127)
Pr(type 3) 3 0.3483 0.3502
(0.0188) (0.0137)
Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors in parenthesis.
First, the estimate of the standard deviation of measurement error in wages for our
preferred speci￿cation (1) is very plausible. In particular, the estimated standard deviation
of measurement error is 0.1777 and for wage o￿ers is 0.3176. Along with the variation in mean
wages due to unobserved heterogeneity, these coe￿cients imply that about 12.7 percent of the
variation in observed wages is due to the presence of measurement error. On the other hand,
26for speci￿cation (2) where we impose the restriction that  = 0, the estimated standard
deviations of measurement error and wages are 0.2439 and 0.2671, which implies that 24.2
percent of the variation in observed wages is due to measurement error. More importantly,
as alluded to in our discussion of identi￿cation (Section 4.4), without modeling utility from
non-wage job characteristics, the higher relative importance of measurement error depresses
the estimated standard deviation in wage o￿ers from 0.3176 to 0.2671. Taken together, these
two speci￿cations of the model clearly demonstrate that empirical search models which ignore
non-wage utility will provide an upward biased estimate of the extent of measurement error
in wages, and will also provide a downward biased estimate of the amount of variation in
the wage o￿er distribution.
The implications of adding non-wage utility to the standard on-the-job search model are
made even more apparent by comparing simulated data from speci￿cations (1) and (2) of the
model. Table 4 presents mean wages and utility, and percent changes in wages and utility, by
employer number within a job cycle. These simulated data are obtained by simulating careers
for one million arti￿cial agents over a 300 month time horizon. A comparison of the mean
wage changes between columns (1) and (2) of Table 4 demonstrates that the compressed wage
o￿er distribution in the model that ignores non-wage utility generates lower wage growth
from job mobility. Notice that between employers 1 and 2, between employers 2 and 3,
and over all voluntary transitions, the mean percentage increases in wages are 11.7, 8.8 and
9.5 for our preferred speci￿cation (1). But for speci￿cation (2), where the estimated wage
o￿er distribution has been compressed by the assumption that  = 0, the mean percentage
increases are only 9.6, 7.5 and 8.1. That is, the compressed wage o￿er distribution results
in lower wage growth due to mobility.
Second, and perhaps more importantly from our perspective, utility from non-wage job
characteristics is a very important factor as workers evaluate both unemployed and employed
job o￿ers. In particular, Table 3 shows that the variation in the utility from the non-wage
match is only slightly less than the variation in the wage o￿er distribution (0.2657 vs. 0.3176).
27Table 4: Steady State Cross Section of Simulated Wages and Utility by Employer
Speci￿cation
(1) (2)
Employer 1 Mean wage 2.09 2.11
Mean utility 2.36 2.11
Employer 2 Mean wage 2.27 2.29
Mean % change in wage 11.7% 9.6%
Mean utility 2.55 2.29
Mean % change in utility 16.0% 9.6%
mean()/mean(utility) 0.28 0.0
Employer 3 Mean Wage 2.40 2.40
Mean % change in wage 8.8% 7.5%
Mean utility 2.68 2.40
Mean % change in utility 12.4% 7.5%
mean()/mean(utility) 0.40 0.0
All Employers Mean wage 2.25 2.37
Mean % change in wage 9.5% 8.1%
Mean utility 2.53 2.37
Mean % change in utility 13.2% 8.1%
mean()/mean(utility) 0.34 0.0
Notes: Speci￿cations (1) and (2) refer to the estimates in Table 3.
As a result, the standard deviation of the total utility of a job o￿er is 0.4141. This is in
comparison to the standard deviation of total utility (i.e., the log-wage) of 0.2671 when non-
wage utility is omitted from the model. These results imply that the standard on-the-job
search model underestimates the gains from mobility in two ways. First, as pointed out in the
prior paragraph, in the absence of non-wage utility, estimated measurement error must rise
and consequently, the estimated variation in wage o￿ers must fall. As a result, wage growth
from job-to-job transitions will also be depressed. Second, ignoring non-wage utility misses an
important component of job-to-job utility increases. The ￿rst column of Table 4 shows that,
on average, the mean percentage increases in total utility between employers 1 and 2, 2 and 3,
and over all voluntary transitions are 16.0, 12.4 and 13.2. Quantitatively, mobility to higher
non-wage matches is an important component of the total gains to workers from job mobility:
increases in  account for 28 percent of the total gains in utility (mean ()=mean(U)) at
the ￿rst transition between employers, 40 percent of the total gains at the second transition,
and 34 percent of the total gains across all transitions. In aggregate, the bene￿ts to workers
28Table 5: Career and Steady State Outcomes: Baseline vs. Counterfactual (  = 0) Simula-
tions
Statistic Model Speci￿cation
Notation Baseline Counterfactual % change












t=0 tUt 210.1 201.9  4:0%
Steady state summary statistics
mean wage 2.26 2.45
employment utility 2.53 2.45
employment rate 0.75 0.67
Notes: Baseline simulation uses the estimates from speci￿cation (1).
Counterfactual simulation uses the estimates from speci￿cation (1), but imposes  = 0:
from job mobility are considerably understated by models that ignore non-wage utility.
As discussed in the previous paragraph, di￿erences in the simulated data between speci-
￿cations (1) and (2) arise from two sources. First, a direct e￿ect from eliminating non-wage
utility, and second, an indirect e￿ect from changes in other estimated parameters (such
as the wage o￿er distribution) caused by estimating the model under the restriction that
 = 0: To isolate the direct e￿ect of non-wage utility on workers, we simulate a counter-
factual dataset which uses the parameter estimates from speci￿cation (1), but imposes the
condition that workers do not search over non-wage job characteristics by setting  = 0:24
Summary statistics for this counterfactual experiment are shown in Table 5.
The counterfactual experiment demonstrates that even with an appropriate estimate
of the wage o￿er distribution from speci￿cation (1), eliminating non-wage utility a￿ects
workers’ optimal search strategies. In particular, if workers do not search over non-wage
job characteristics, they have less ￿exibility in the choice over job o￿ers and as a result, are
optimally more selective (U  increases). Also, in the baseline model workers are willing to
accept low wage job o￿ers that o￿er high non-wage utility, but in the counterfactual model
24This simulation introduces an additional complication because the estimated reservation utility depends
on the distribution of , as shown in equation (10). Thus in order to simulate the model under the assumption
that  = 0, we need to ￿rst recalculate U after imposing  = 0.
29they are not able to make this trade o￿. Both of these e￿ects increase the counterfactual
mean steady-state log-wage relative to the baseline speci￿cation (2.45 vs 2.26).
Despite the fact that the mean wage rises when there is no variation in non-wage utility,
the average discounted sum of log-wages over the career is actually lower (142.4 vs 148.4
for speci￿cation (1)) in the counterfactual model. This happens because without the con-
sideration of non-wage job characteristics, workers do not take poorly paid jobs, so the rate
of employment actually falls (0.67 vs 0.75 for speci￿cation (1)). That is, the presence of
non-wage job characteristics provides workers with greater ￿exibility in the selection of jobs,
resulting in less time spent unemployed, greater lifetime earnings, and greater overall utility.
Table 5 also shows the discounted expected value of lifetime utility in the baseline and
counterfactual simulated labor markets. The average discounted expected value of lifetime
utility is an estimate of the value function, and can be used to quantify the welfare impact of
search over non-wage utility. On average, the mean discounted sum of lifetime utility when
workers can search over non-wage job characteristics is 210.1 whereas when workers only
search over wages, mean lifetime utility is 201.9. This di￿erence of 8.2 ￿utils￿ implies that an
average worker living in our counterfactual world could be made just as well o￿ as an average
worker from speci￿cation (1) with an additional weekly payment of $40.66 (assuming a 40
hour work week). With a mean steady-state wage of about $9.54 or weekly earnings of about
$381, $40.66 amounts to nearly 11 percent of a typical worker’s weekly earnings. In other
words, the average worker is willing to pay 11 percent of his earnings to obtain the option
value of searching over non-wage job characteristics.
Unobserved worker heterogeneity is also an important consideration in estimating our
model. However, its primary importance for our purposes is as a control so that we ob-
tain unbiased estimates of the parameters of primary interest. 25 Nevertheless, it is worth
discussing the parameter estimates that capture unobserved worker heterogeneity since the
estimates provide evidence of substantial unobserved di￿erences across workers. Since it is
25The minimized value of the SMD objective function is 718.3 for a one type model which assumes that
all workers are homogeneous. The minimized objective function falls to 332.9 and 248.9 for models which
allow for two and three discrete types.
30Table 6: Mean Outcomes by Type in Simulated Data
Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 All Types
Employment duration 5.38 6.77 42.84 10.51
Unemployment duration 17.53 5.29 7.59 7.12
Log-Wage 1.33 2.07 2.29 2.00
Utility (while employed) 1.54 2.35 2.38 2.25
Disc. EV lifetime utility 153.37 214.15 222.06 210.07
Proportion 0.11 0.54 0.35 1.00
Notes: Durations in months.
sometimes di￿cult to see how di￿erences in these primitive parameters across types translate
into labor market outcomes, Table 6 summarizes outcomes in the simulated data conditional
on type. This table also shows the discounted expected value of lifetime utility for each type.
Although we do not directly compute the value function during estimation, it is straightfor-
ward to approximate the value function using the average discounted lifetime utility realized
in a large number of simulated careers generated by the model. 26
Unobserved heterogeneity across workers has a large e￿ect on labor market outcomes.
Type 1 workers have the shortest average employment duration, the longest average unem-
ployment duration, and by far the lowest average log-wage. Type 3’s have by far the longest
average employment duration of nearly 43 months, but also experience the second longest
mean unemployment duration because they have the lowest unemployed job o￿er probability.
Type 3’s on average receive a log-wage that is nearly double that of type 1’s, and is about
11 percent larger than that of a Type 2 worker. The di￿erences in parameter values across
types translate into moderate di￿erences in the expected discounted value of lifetime utility.
The discounted expected value of lifetime utilities for Type 2 and 3 workers are fairly similar
and are about 40 percent higher than the discounted expected value of lifetime utility for
the frequently unemployed, low wage, Type 1 workers.
26The value function estimates are based on 1,000,000 simulated individuals over 300 months.
315.2 Model Fit
It is also interesting to note that the model does an excellent job ￿tting the data. Table 2
shows the moments from the NLSY97 data used to estimate the model along with the simu-
lated moments generated by the parameter estimates shown in Table 3 for speci￿cation (1)
of the model. Overall, the ￿t of the model to these moments is very good. In particular,
the model captures the upward trend in average wages and employment durations as indi-
viduals move between employers within employment cycles. The model also generates wage
dispersion, conditional on employer number, that closely matches the standard deviation of
wages in the NLSY97 data. Panel 4 of Table 2 shows that the model slightly under-predicts
the reduced form wage-experience pro￿le, which is perhaps not surprising because the search
model does not allow for wage growth due to human capital. However, the di￿erence between
predicted and actual wage growth is relatively small: at the mean level of experience in the
NLSY97 data, the predicted and actual mean log-wages di￿er by only 0.019.
The model also does a good job matching the transition and duration moments shown
in Panels 2 and 3 of Table 2. In particular, the model closely tracks patterns in mean wage
changes in the NLSY97 data. Importantly, given the focus of the paper, the model predicts
that 38.7 percent of job-to-job transitions will involve a wage decrease, while 36.4 percent
of job-to-job transitions in the NLSY97 data have this feature. Finally, the model is in
general successful in ￿tting the within person covariance moments which are generated by
unobserved heterogeneity, and in ￿tting the across-person moments shown in Panels 5 and
6 of Table 2.
5.3 Sensitivity Analysis: Correlation Between Wage O￿ers and
Non-Wage Utility
This section examines the sensitivity of our estimates to the assumption that log-wage and
non-wage utility o￿ers, (w;), are independent. As discussed in Section 4, arguments can
be made in favor of either a positive or negative correlation. For example, amenities such
32Table 7: Parameter Estimates Conditional on Fixed (;w)
Parameter Estimates
Notation (;w) = 0 (;w) =  0:20 (;w) = 0:20
Stand. dev. of wage o￿er w 0.3176 0.3318 0.2986
(0.0039)
Stand. dev. of non-wage match  0.2657 0.3246 0.2716
(0.0063)
Stand. dev. of measurement error " 0.1777 0.1197 0.2046
(0.0243)
Notes: The estimates shown in the column headed by (;w) = 0 correspond to the baseline version of the
model (shown for reference purposes). The ￿nal two columns show the parameter estimates from versions
of the model that assume a non-zero value of (;w). All model parameters are re-estimated in each
speci￿cation, but only three parameters are shown here in the interest of readability.
as employer provided health insurance and retirement bene￿ts are positively correlated with
wages. On the other hand, unpleasant or dangerous jobs (low  jobs) are associated with
higher wages. Most importantly, the correlation between w and  is not identi￿ed using
available data. As such, we exogenously impose di￿erent correlations between w and ,
re-estimate the model, and examine the sensitivity of the key model parameters.
Table 7 presents an abbreviated table of parameter estimates that includes the standard
deviations of the wage, non-wage match, and measurement error. In this exercise, we assume
that (w;) are distributed bivariate normal with correlation parameter (w;), and present
estimates for correlations of  0:20 and 0.20. Most importantly for our purposes, we ￿nd that
the estimate of  is quite robust to changes in the correlation parameter of this magnitude.
In fact, the results of this experiment suggest that our preferred estimate of  = 0:2657
represents a lower bound on the importance of non-wage utility.
Also notable is that the amount of measurement error falls for a negative correlation and
rises for a positive correlation. The intuition is straightforward: when wages and non-wage
33utility are negatively correlated, low wage o￿ers tend to be balanced by good non-wage job
characteristics, so less measurement error is needed to rationalize voluntary moves to lower
wage jobs. The converse is true with a positive correlation. In order to compensate for lower
(higher) levels of measurement error when  =  0:20 ( = 0:20), the standard deviation of
wage o￿ers is slightly higher for a negative (positive) correlation.
5.4 Implications for Compensating Wage Di￿erentials
The empirical literature on compensating wage di￿erentials often yields mixed results. For
example, Brown (1980) showed that even controlling for individual characteristics, hedonic
estimates are ￿often wrong signed or insigni￿cant.￿ In this section, we provide a brief discus-
sion of this topic to illustrate the implications of incorporating non-wage job characteristics
into a search model to standard, static hedonic estimates of compensating wage di￿erentials.
In Sullivan and To (2011), we show in detail how and why search over wages and non-wage
job characteristics can yield biased compensating wage di￿erential estimates.
Broadly speaking, a bias arises because optimal search behavior by workers implies that
accepted job o￿ers are truncated from below. Since total utility for employed workers is
typically greater than their reservation utility level, observed job choices do not directly reveal
the willingness to pay for non-wage job characteristics. 27 Given our additively separable
utility function, U = w+, the known willingness to pay is one-to-one so that in a frictionless
labor market, the compensating wage di￿erential should be  1. Although our simulated
dataset reveals a trade-o￿ between wages and non-wage job characteristics, the fact that
most jobs o￿er total utility strictly above the reservation level biases willingness-to-pay
estimates towards zero. Indeed, estimating a traditional hedonic regression of simulated
log-wages on  yields a slope coe￿cient of only  0:48. Search frictions result in a severely
attenuated compensating wage di￿erential estimate.
In general, when search frictions are an important feature of the labor market, compen-
27Indeed, with a continuous wage o￿er distribution, it must be the case that acceptable job o￿ers almost
always yield utility greater than the reservation level.
34sating wage di￿erential estimates will be biased. This is similar to the ￿ndings of Jolivet et al.
(2006), who estimate a model with several non-wage job characteristics. They ￿nd strong
preferences for amenities but little evidence of compensating di￿erentials in their simulated
data. Our aggregate approach with choice over just two dimensions draws a clear picture
of precisely how search frictions interact to bias compensating wage di￿erential estimates.
In our model, biased compensating wage di￿erential estimates arise because search frictions
imply that acceptable jobs typically provide utility greater than the reservation level. This
explanation di￿ers from that of Hwang et al. (1992), who show that compensating wage
di￿erential estimates are biased because in equilibrium, total job valuation is correlated with
the amenity level.
6 Concluding Remarks
This paper develops and estimates an on-the-job search model which allows workers to
search across jobs based on both wages and job-speci￿c non-wage utility ￿ows. Estimating
the model provides a direct test of the widespread assumption that workers act as pure in-
come maximizers. We estimate the structural model by simulated minimum distance using
the NLSY97. The importance of non-wage utility is revealed through voluntary job-to-job
moves, wage changes at transitions, and job durations. Measurement error in wages is sepa-
rately identi￿ed from non-wage utility because incorrectly attributing events not explained
by observed wages to measurement error compresses the estimated wage o￿er distribution
and as a result, causes the model to generate too little wage growth relative to the data.
The empirical results show that workers place a substantial value on non-wage job char-
acteristics. When searching for a job, workers face nearly as much dispersion in non-wage
utility matches as in wage o￿ers. Furthermore, utility from non-wage job characteristics ac-
counts for approximately one-third of the total gains to workers from job mobility. Standard
income maximizing models of on-the-job search, which are frequently used to quantify the
gains to mobility, are missing a sizable fraction of the gains from search.
35We estimate several di￿erent speci￿cations of the structural model to examine the sen-
sitivity of the results to alternative assumptions about the correlation between wage o￿ers
and non-wage match values. Although there are some shifts in the parameter estimates, the
key parameters (w, , and ") are relatively stable, and the changes in these parameters
between speci￿cations have intuitive explanations. Most importantly, the sensitivity analysis
suggests that the baseline speci￿cation of the model provides a lower bound estimate of the
importance of non-wage utility.
Our model also provides a framework for understanding the di￿culty that economists
have had in estimating compensating wage di￿erentials. In a frictionless competitive labor
market, equally able workers must receive the same total compensation and the estimated
wage di￿erential for a job attribute will equal the workers’ willingness-to-pay for that at-
tribute. In contrast, in a labor market with search frictions, total utility will in general
exceed a worker’s reservation utility and di￿erent, equally able workers will receive di￿erent
compensation packages, biasing estimates of compensating wage di￿erentials.
A Appendix: Derivation of Reservation Utility
The reservation utility level for unemployed agents, U, solves V e(U) = V u. To derive U,
we must ￿rst rearrange (3) and (2) so that common terms can be collected when evaluated
at U = U. Subtracting V e(U) from both sides of (3):
(1   )V













































Similarly, subtracting V u from both sides of (2),
(1   )V













Evaluating at U = U, we can equate (8) and (9), integrate by parts and solve to get:
U























When u > e + le (the probability of receiving an o￿er while unemployed is greater
than that when employed), an unemployed worker’s reservation wage exceeds the one-period
utility ￿ow from unemployment.
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